04/13/05

Many have asked how it could be that a comparatively small group of intelligence analysts in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was able to get it right on several key Iraq-related issues, while larger agencies like CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency -- with, literally, a cast of thousands -- got it so wrong. The answer is simple: INR had the guts to be the skunk at the picnic. State Department analysts showed backbone in resisting White House pressure, as well as in-house prodding from the likes of Under Secretary of State John Bolton, to cook intelligence to the White House recipe. ... INR analysts dissented loudly from some of the most important key judgments of the infamous National Intelligence Estimate, 'Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction' of Oct. 1, 2002...

http://tinyurl.com/5obxn

from Tom Paine, by Ray McGovern


Informant: Thomas L. Knapp