Vote Scams : System Test Lab Omitted Test for Tamperability
Freedom of Information requests at http://www.blackboxvoting.org have unearthed two Ciber certification reports indicating that security and tamperability was NOT TESTED and that several state elections directors, a secretary of state, and Dr. Britain Williams signed off on the report anyway, certifying it.
The documents, posted at Black Box Voting (.ORG) show that Ciber Labs' Shawn Southworth used a conformance chart specifying FEC regulations, marking each test item "pass" or "fail."
Southworth “tested” whether every candidate on the ballot has a name. But we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most important question -- about vulnerable entry points -- Southworth’s report says “not reviewed.”
Ciber “tested” whether the manual gives a description of the voting system. But when asked to identify methods of attack (which we think the American voter would consider pretty important), the top-secret report says “not applicable.”
Ciber “tested” whether ballots comply with local regulations, but when we asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold tabulators accepting large numbers of “minus” votes, he said he didn’t mention that in his report because “the vendors don’t like him to put anything negative” inhis report. After all, he said, he is paid by the vendors.
Was this just a one-time oversight?
Nope. It appears to be more like a habit. We also posted the sister report, for another vendor entirely, VoteHere, and you can see that the critical security test, the “penetration analysis” was again marked “not applicable” and was not done.
Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?
Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could continue with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its testing altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.
Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.
Black Box Voting has posted a full Ciber report on GEMS 1.18.15. We also posted a .zip file download for the GEMS 1.18.15 program. We also provided a real live Diebold vote database. Compare your findings against the official testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail us your findings.
Who the heck is NASED?
They are the people who certified this stuff. Now, if the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a voting system, and you get a report that says security was “not tested” and “not applicable” -- what would you do?
Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Hold them accountable for the election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) Their names are listed on the Web site.
Bev Harris
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FOCUS: Voting: Electronic Miscounts Multiply
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110704V.shtml
--------
http://www.theeveningleader.com/articles/2004/11/06/news/news.01.txt
ES&S Operative Had Access to Ohio Ballot Computer --In a letter dated Oct. 21, Ken Nuss, former deputy director of the Auglaize County Board of Elections, claimed that Joe McGinnis, a former employee of Election Systems and Software (ES&S), the company that provides the voting system in Auglaize County, was on the main computer that is used to create the ballot and compile election results, which would go against election protocol. Nuss claimed in the letter that McGinnis was allowed to use the computer the weekend of Oct. 16. Nuss, who resigned from his job Oct. 21 after being suspended for a day, was responsible for overseeing the computerized programming of election software, according to his job description. His resignation is effective Nov. 11.
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On The Front Lines in Florida --statement by five people who staffed the emergency hotline for the Kerry Campaign Headquarters in Broward County (FL) from late October through the election --"Many of the calls to our hotline were from voters who had pressed the 'Kerry' button on their electronic voting screen, only to have 'Bush' light up as the candidate they had chosen. In some cases, this would happen repeatedly until about the 5th or 6th time the voter pressed 'Kerry' and eventually his name would light up. In other cases, the voters pushed 'Kerry' but were later asked to confirm their 'Bush' vote."
http://www.legitgov.org/essay_front_lines_in_florida_110704.html
--------
http://www.theeveningleader.com/articles/2004/11/06/news/news.01.txt
Another Piece of the GOP Ohio Election Theft Puzzle?
--------
FOCUS: Thom Hartmann | Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804Z.shtml
--------
William Rivers Pitt | Worse Than 2000: Tuesday's Electoral Disaster
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804A.shtml
--------
None dare call it voter suppression and fraud
by Bob Fitrakis
November 7, 2004
Evidence is mounting that the 2004 presidential election was stolen in Ohio. Emerging revelations of voting irregularities coupled with well-documented
Republican efforts at voter suppression prior to the election suggests that in a fair election Kerry would have won Ohio...
Read more:
http://www.freepress.org/columns/display/3/2004/983
The Free Press
http://www.freepress.org
Informant: Shanti Renfrew
The documents, posted at Black Box Voting (.ORG) show that Ciber Labs' Shawn Southworth used a conformance chart specifying FEC regulations, marking each test item "pass" or "fail."
Southworth “tested” whether every candidate on the ballot has a name. But we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most important question -- about vulnerable entry points -- Southworth’s report says “not reviewed.”
Ciber “tested” whether the manual gives a description of the voting system. But when asked to identify methods of attack (which we think the American voter would consider pretty important), the top-secret report says “not applicable.”
Ciber “tested” whether ballots comply with local regulations, but when we asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold tabulators accepting large numbers of “minus” votes, he said he didn’t mention that in his report because “the vendors don’t like him to put anything negative” inhis report. After all, he said, he is paid by the vendors.
Was this just a one-time oversight?
Nope. It appears to be more like a habit. We also posted the sister report, for another vendor entirely, VoteHere, and you can see that the critical security test, the “penetration analysis” was again marked “not applicable” and was not done.
Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?
Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could continue with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its testing altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.
Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.
Black Box Voting has posted a full Ciber report on GEMS 1.18.15. We also posted a .zip file download for the GEMS 1.18.15 program. We also provided a real live Diebold vote database. Compare your findings against the official testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail us your findings.
Who the heck is NASED?
They are the people who certified this stuff. Now, if the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a voting system, and you get a report that says security was “not tested” and “not applicable” -- what would you do?
Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Hold them accountable for the election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) Their names are listed on the Web site.
Bev Harris
--------
FOCUS: Voting: Electronic Miscounts Multiply
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110704V.shtml
--------
http://www.theeveningleader.com/articles/2004/11/06/news/news.01.txt
ES&S Operative Had Access to Ohio Ballot Computer --In a letter dated Oct. 21, Ken Nuss, former deputy director of the Auglaize County Board of Elections, claimed that Joe McGinnis, a former employee of Election Systems and Software (ES&S), the company that provides the voting system in Auglaize County, was on the main computer that is used to create the ballot and compile election results, which would go against election protocol. Nuss claimed in the letter that McGinnis was allowed to use the computer the weekend of Oct. 16. Nuss, who resigned from his job Oct. 21 after being suspended for a day, was responsible for overseeing the computerized programming of election software, according to his job description. His resignation is effective Nov. 11.
--------
On The Front Lines in Florida --statement by five people who staffed the emergency hotline for the Kerry Campaign Headquarters in Broward County (FL) from late October through the election --"Many of the calls to our hotline were from voters who had pressed the 'Kerry' button on their electronic voting screen, only to have 'Bush' light up as the candidate they had chosen. In some cases, this would happen repeatedly until about the 5th or 6th time the voter pressed 'Kerry' and eventually his name would light up. In other cases, the voters pushed 'Kerry' but were later asked to confirm their 'Bush' vote."
http://www.legitgov.org/essay_front_lines_in_florida_110704.html
--------
http://www.theeveningleader.com/articles/2004/11/06/news/news.01.txt
Another Piece of the GOP Ohio Election Theft Puzzle?
--------
FOCUS: Thom Hartmann | Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804Z.shtml
--------
William Rivers Pitt | Worse Than 2000: Tuesday's Electoral Disaster
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804A.shtml
--------
None dare call it voter suppression and fraud
by Bob Fitrakis
November 7, 2004
Evidence is mounting that the 2004 presidential election was stolen in Ohio. Emerging revelations of voting irregularities coupled with well-documented
Republican efforts at voter suppression prior to the election suggests that in a fair election Kerry would have won Ohio...
Read more:
http://www.freepress.org/columns/display/3/2004/983
The Free Press
http://www.freepress.org
Informant: Shanti Renfrew
Starmail - 8. Nov, 18:21
